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Trade Gone Bananas:  
A Study of Political Control over Trade 
Introduction 
Fredrik Olofson 
 
Trade patterns and trade partners occur in ever-changing constella-
tions. Allies becomes rivals and vice versa. This thesis examines 
what factors creates trade and with the example of the Banana 
wars, tests if the European Union’s trade relation with its former 
colonies is driven by something other than neoclassical trade 
theory. Built on an inductive framework with a qualitative 
expectation of why the Banana wars occurred relevant sections are 
added to test the expectation. While much previous research 
focuses on the Banana wars and the consequences of it, little 
attention has been given the incitements for the European Unions 
continued banana trade with its former colonies.  The findings 
presented in this thesis suggest that old neo-colonial structures still 
influences how governments and institutions set up trade 
agreements and after the agreement in the Banana wars finally was 
met, a gloomy picture for the future banana production in Europe’s 
former colonies are drawn. The trade partnership between the old 
colonies and its former colonizers cannot meet the greater 
competition from Latin American banana producers and the EU 
market will most likely be dominated by a few large US owned 
banana producers. Adding to the ambiguity is the expanding 
European Union of Eastern-European states joining without any 
colonizing background. Although the EU previously has been 
successful in governing its banana trade, the future for the banana 
producers of the former colonies looks uncertain according to this 
thesis. 
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“Although bananas may only look like a fruit, they represent a wide variety of environ-
mental, economic, social and political problems. The banana trade symbolizes economic impe-
rialism, injustices in the global trade market, and the globalization of the agricultural 
economy”. 
-Rebecca Cohen, Global Issues for Breakfast: The Banana Industry and its Problems, The Science 
Creative Quarterly, Issue 3, September 07 – April 08 
 
troduction 
For my Master thesis I have chosen to work with political control of trade. For many 
countries there has been a paradox between economic arguments advocating low trade barriers 
such as tariffs and customs while at the same time wanting to promote the political idea of a 
strong internal market and industry.  
For years the trade relation between the US and Europe has been a fruitful and rewarding 
one.  It is considered the world’s most integrated economic relationship and is currently the 
largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. EU countries exported € 242.1 billion worth of 
goods to the US in 2010 and imported € 169.5 billion worth of US goods the same year. The 
total investment from the US in the EU is three times higher than in the whole of Asia and 
according to the Commission, the EU invests around eight times the amount of what it invests 
in India and China together in the US alone.
1
 
During the years there have of course been a number of trade disputes between the two 
sides. For my thesis I have chosen to study the so called “Banana wars”.  
The European banana trade came to be in the early trade of bananas between the Canary 
Islands and the United Kingdom. The Caribbean trade relation to Europe began when the Brit-
ish Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain in 1901 decided to help Jamaica – 
which was then a British colony – to develop its economy by farming bananas, thereby ending 
the banana trade between the Canary Islands and the United Kingdom.
2
 Four years later the 
banana, together with oranges and apples, had become the most popular fruit in the United 
Kingdom.
3
  
This conflict has its origin in the time just after the Second World War when European 
countries such as Britain, France and Spain gave preferential treatment to their former colonies 
in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (the ACP states)
4
 by importing bananas from them while 
Germany on the other hand supported a free market for bananas without restrictions.  The 
banana production in the former colonies was ineffective and costly but very important for the 
former colonies economy. It is estimated that one third of the total work force on the small 
Caribbean islands was employed in the banana production by the late 1980s.
5
 However, while 
the bananas imported to Britain, France and Spain came from small, local producers the market 
was totally different in Germany where the banana market had been free from restrictions.  The 
German banana market was dominated by the American-owned banana producer Chiquita with 
an estimated 45 % market share. In the early 1990s Chiquita saw the potential in the other 
European markets as well and decided, together with its main competitor Dole Food, to flood 
the Europe with more bananas than what was wanted, consequently dumping the European 
banana market.
6
 
The plan to open the European market did not work for Chiquita and Dole Food and in-
stead the EU decided in 1993 to expand the system with preferential treatment of the former 
colonies and introduced high quotas and tariffs on bananas from Latin America – where 
                                                 
1
 European Commission (2011) Electronic source 
2
 Myers (2004) p. 5-6 
3
 Myers (2004) p. 9 
4
 See Appendix 2 
5
 Myers (2004) p. 2 
6
 Website Bananas. (2012) Electronic source 
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Chiquita and Dole Food had their banana production. The decision had severe consequences on 
both Chiquita’s and Dole Food’s profits.  Chiquita contacted the US government to help them 
against the EU Commission in what was now a “Banana wars”.7  
The World Trade Organization became involved after the US filed a complaint to them 
against the EU and the WTO found the EUs strategy to be in breach of international trade 
rules. The WTO authorized the US to increase their own tariffs on luxury goods from Europe 
(for example German coffee machines, Scottish cashmere and French handbags) as a response 
to the EUs decision.
8
   
The conflict finally came to an end in the so called Geneva deal in 2011 when the EU, 
currently the world’s biggest banana importer, agreed to lower the tariffs on bananas imported 
from Latin America in stages. 
 
Aim and research questions 
 
My aim with this thesis is to examine if it is possible to govern trade markets politically. 
I am using the Banana wars in my research question as an example of when trade is controlled 
by politics and not economics. Hence, my research questions are:  
1) How have the Banana wars been governed by the EU politically? 
2) Has the EU been successful in governing the Banana wars? 
With “politically” I mean in its external trade actions in relations to other trade partners 
such as the ACP countries, the US and within the World Trade Organization. With “the EU” I 
refer to decisions and actions in this conflict by the European Parliament. 
There is a problem of defining and deciding what “successful” means in this matter. 
There is four sides in this; the EU, the former colonies, the US state and the American owned 
banana producers in Latin America. The definition of successful for the purpose of answering 
the above questions in this thesis will be addressed on page 27 in the discussion. 
 My main study question is the first question. It is important to define the unit of analysis 
in the study so it can be understood how the case study might relate to any broader body of 
knowledge and what it might be generalized to. To define the unit of analysis in my thesis I 
chose to address what is being studied in the main study question; the Banana wars. Alterna-
tively, political intrusion of trade could be the unit of analysis but Yin writes that the unit of 
analysis is likely to be at the level being addressed by the main study question.
9
 
  
                                                 
7 Website Bananas (2012) Electronic source 
8
 European Parliament (2011) Ending the Banana wars: Who wins and who loses? Electronic source 
9
 Yin (2009) p. 31 
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Method 
Approach 
 
In the inductive approach knowledge is not seen as static and fixed as in the deductive 
approach. A phenomenon can be considered “true” until proven wrong by new knowledge. It 
is more an approach to develop new theory than validating existing knowledge. Grounded 
theory is perhaps the most well-known inductive method although grounded theory is consid-
ered more of a collection of methods which share certain similarities.
10
 Grounded theory aims 
at developing and discovering theories “grounded” in empirical data by interacting intensely 
with the empirical material. The study starts in the empirical data which is based in the re-
searcher’s theory. Dey writes about “theoretical saturation” in collecting data, it means that 
the researcher unescapably comes to a point where there is no longer a need to collect more 
data since nothing new in the data continued to be collected is presented.
 
When the theoretical 
saturation appears the researcher can start to analyze the data until an apparent core in the 
research becomes evident – grounded.11 
The inductive approach is very flexible and can be useful to explore new areas of re-
search rather than to base it on existing theories and resources.
12 
But the approach has its 
weaknesses as well; there is for example no real consensus in how the much important coding 
in the grounded theory should be conducted, the risk is that the researchers imagination makes 
connections that does not really exist.
13
  
 
Inductive framework 
 
I have chosen to create a theoretical model drawing on Dey’s theoretical saturation the-
ory. The purpose with my model is to facilitate my research and connect all the chapters in a 
clear and rational way. This will ensure me reaching a conclusion and answering my research 
questions.  
My theoretical model: 
1) Set up a qualitative expectation of why the examined research problem occurred. 
In other words what I, the researcher, expect is the answer before the theory is 
written.  
2) Analyze the result and compare with the initial expectation. 
3) If necessary collect further theoretical knowledge and add new chapters. 
4) When enough theoretical knowledge has been collected (grounded) the analysis 
can be conducted and a conclusion may be drawn.  
 
  
                                                 
10 
Seale et al. (2004) p 80-81 
11 
Seale et al. (2004) p 80-81 
12 
Seale et al.  (2004) p 90 
13 
Seale et al.  (2004) p 81 
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A figure of my theoretical model: 
 
 
Applied to the research questions the onset of this thesis is: 
1) If, as described in the introduction section, the banana trade between the EU and 
its former colonies in the ACP countries cannot be explained by trade theory 
what can? 
2) In order to answer this my theory needs to include chapters about: 
(a) Trade theory.  
(b) The EU/ACP trade relation and agreements. 
(c) The EU/US trade relation and agreements. 
(d) The role of the WTO. 
(e) A description of the trade disagreement. 
3) The theory chapters are then compiled and evaluated in the discussion and a con-
clusion may be drawn.  
 
There is an issue of prejudice and preconception with my model since I myself chose 
what chapters I think is necessary to answer my research questions. Marshall and Rossman 
refer to Lincoln and Guba (1985) who set up procedures to ensure a high degree of validity in 
qualitative research and argued that one hundred percent objectivity in research is not possi-
ble. One of the procedures was the “peer debriefing method” where the researcher should tri-
angulate by gathering data from multiple sources, methods and theoretical lenses.
14
 In other 
words, I can only do my very best to be objective by using a variety of sources and perspec-
tives when I chose which chapters to add to the theory section.  
 
Previous studies 
 
The Banana wars have been the longest running trade dispute in the EU’s history and 
consequently a lot of academic literature exists concerning the issue. A researcher should 
validate through other researchers’ publications the qualitative research tradition that the pro-
                                                 
14
 Marshall and Rossman (2011) p. 40 
My independent expectation 
to why the case study's 
problem occured.
Is my theoretical knowledge 
sufficent to draw my 
conclusion?
Yes No
Draw conclusion
Collect more theoretical 
knowledge (add chapters)
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posed design is following. This demonstrates knowledge of the historical and ongoing meth-
odological discourse of qualitative research and the specific genre of the study.
15
 The different 
studies of the Banana wars all use different views and perspectives on the dispute and the 
studies presented below are examples of alternative approaches to the dispute.  The studies 
will first be presented followed by a discussion to relate my contribution to these previous 
studies.  
In the first study Ames compiles the three most well-known trade disputes between the 
US and the EU in an article from 2001. He presents the background to the three disputes; the 
Banana wars, the beef dispute and the biotechnology dispute. Ames writes that these disputes 
stems from rent-seeking by special interests, consumers’ fears about food safety and a mis-
trust of government regulation and enforcement. He argues that the EU´s refusal to abide the 
World Trade Organizations rulings threatens the integrity of the WTO since it cannot override 
domestic political concerns if the contracting parties disagree with their findings. Ames draws 
a parallel between the Banana wars and the debate over Corn Laws in the 18
th
 century. The 
Corn Laws restricted the supply of grain which effectively increased the food prices while 
raising the rent on English land that produced grain. According to Ames the end result of the 
two disputes is the same; higher prices for consumers and rents to those who control access to 
the European market.
16
 
The beef dispute origins from a 1980s EU prohibition of hormones in meat production 
which included US meat imports containing hormones as well. WTO rules permit such prohi-
bitions but only if scientific evidence can be presented that support the reason for the ban. The 
US, together with Canada, made a formal complaint about the EU’s prohibition to the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body which in 1997 concluded that the EU did not comply with WTO 
rules and the EU appealed the WTO ruling.  According to Ames the beef dispute may have a 
different origin than the banana dispute but the results are the same; restrictions on imports 
and a difficult trade dispute between the trading parties.  The third dispute Ames examines is 
the relatively new dispute over biotechnology and genetically modified seeds. According to 
the US the EU’s imports of US produced agricultural and food products were restricted. The 
EU lifted the suspension of these biotechnology products by approving a special genetically 
engineered corn variety from the US. But a number of EU states continued the restriction and 
the WTO ruled that these states violated WTO rules.  
Ames concludes that trade disputes like these could potentially jeopardize commerce 
between two of the world’s largest trading blocs and that the EU has to respect and follow 
WTO rulings since not complying with them weakens the integrity of the world trading sys-
tem. Complying with the WTO rulings on competition in banana imports may threaten a few 
international produce firms in Europe but the gains to consumers and the integrity of the 
world trading system should outweigh any losses by these few companies according to Ames. 
Another study of the Banana wars has been made by Frundt in 2005 where he argued 
that the key to clarify the real issues involved in the dispute was to be found in the connection 
between meaning and structure. Debates surrounding globalization has often focused on “fair 
trade” vs. “free trade”. He argues that the banana dispute began to test the connection between 
meaning and structure with a key question; do global elites hold ideological primacy over 
trade definitions, or can an alliance among trade activist forge alternative systems of meaning 
that repositions fairness as a required component of trade? According to Frundt different for-
mulations and meanings predominates the discussion about the dispute at different times. Ex-
amples of such formulations can be “designated markets”, “historic banana trade patterns”, 
“encouragement of nationally-based independent producers” or “support of environmentally-
sustainable banana cultivation”. Frundt use social theories from Mannheim and Lukács to 
Gramsci and Habermas to explain the construction of “meaning”.  As a structural “backdrop” 
                                                 
15
 Marshall and Rossman (2011) p. 96 
16
 Ames (2001) p. 214-222 
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to the conflict Frundt use (1) the American-owned banana producers in Latin America, (2) the 
various state and regional regulations, (3) the nationally-based associate banana producers, (4) 
the strong banana-unions and (5) the expanding capacity of consumers to examine the condi-
tions under which their purchased bananas are produced. Frundt use the different meaning of 
“fair trade” which was used when the conflict broke out in 1993. The structural groups above 
asserted hegemonic control by attempting to control the public perceptions of “fair trade” as:  
1) Fair trade as a struggle to protect small producers vs. the control by the US con-
trolled producers in Latin America. 
2) Fair trade as protection for traditional markets and interests. 
3) Fair trade as an opportunity for local “independent” producers. 
4) Fair trade as assurance of worker rights and conditions. 
5) Fair trade as concern for sustainable practices. 
Frundt examines each of these meanings and how they contended with a proposed new 
banana policy. In his conclusions he argues for an interaction among these five meanings of 
fair trade discourse had been taking place. According to Frundt an elite ideology was succee-
ded by grassroots praxis. The dispute illustrates what happens when an imperial free trade 
structure and ideology is replaced: the proponents gradually triumphed over the oppositional 
elite hegemonies. Since unions collaborate with fair trade advocates, environmentalists and 
smallholder organizations Frundt sees the hegemonic meaning of fair trade to replace the 
structural strengths of the free trade approach permanently.
17
  
Since the studies by Ames and Frundt are written before the Banana wars finally ended 
in 2011 my main advantage and contribution compared to their studies is my ability to 
involve the Geneva deal in mine. Where Ames study is interesting from a world trade per-
spective it just examines what has happened in the banana disagreement and not why it has 
happened as my study aims to do. My study involves the former colonies and developing 
countries in a more explicit manner than Ames who only sees the conflict from an EU/US 
perspective. My contribution compared to Ames study is to include these states to the world 
trading system and hopefully provide a more nuanced view on why the EU has acted as it has 
in the conflict.  
A very different study on the subject is made by Frundt with the focus on fairness as a 
required component of trade. Although fair trade does not seem to have been a strong argu-
ment in the Geneva deal perhaps an increased focus on fair trade instead of free trade, as 
Frundt concludes, exist can give incitement for a continued banana production in the EUs 
former colonies. Ames study represents a stand for free trade and Frundt can be said to repre-
sent the more political stand of fair trade. As my contribution, I hope to combine these per-
spectives to see how the EU has acted in the Banana wars, and if it has been successful.  
  
                                                 
17
 Frundt (2005) p. 215-237 
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Theory 
 
In order to see if the banana trade between the EU and its former colonies in the ACP 
countries can be explained by something other than trade theory it is required to see what 
trade theory is and what components create trade. 
 
Trade 
  
Trade theory identifies two main forces behind international trade; the differences be-
tween countries and economies of scale in production. There is however no clear division 
between them in real life but any country’s specific trade pattern can be explained by these 
two forces in different constellations.
18
 
One of the most recognized trade theories is David Ricardo’s neoclassical theory of 
comparative advantage in the production of certain goods. The theory explains trade patterns 
on the differences between countries and on the assumption of perfect competition. It is called 
“comparative” since the focus is on opportunity costs (the value of the next-highest-valued 
alternative use of that resource).
19
 In other words; The cost advantage of producing a certain 
type of goods is compared and measured relative to the cost of producing other kinds of 
goods. Ricardo’s theory suggests that gains can be made in international trade if a country 
specializes in the production of a certain good where it holds a comparative advantage ergo; 
where the opportunity costs of producing the goods are lower than in its trading partners and 
the countries gets the most output per input.
20
 
Expanding on Ricardo’s theory is the Heckscher-Ohlin theory which can be viewed as a 
factor-proportions model of international trade. The theory suggests that the differences be-
tween countries (the comparative advantage), lie in the different endowment of resources and 
technology of production between the countries. A country will have a comparative advantage 
in producing and exporting goods which relies most on the locally abundant factors of pro-
duction and import products that use their scare factors. If a country for example has an abun-
dance of labor it should produce and export labor-intensive goods and a country with a rela-
tive abundance of capital should produce and export capital-intensive goods. The theory how-
ever makes a number of assumptions and conditions to work. A crucial assumption is for ex-
ample that both countries have identical production technology. It also depends on that the 
relative availability of capital and labour are differing internationally and that a state of per-
fect internal competition exists in the trading countries where labour or capital does not have 
the power to affect prices or factor rates by limiting the supply. Furthermore there can be no 
barriers to trade in the theory and capital and labor movements are not allowed since this 
would equalize the relative abundances of the two production factors.
21
 
The New Trade Theory claims that trade can be conducted even if the endowments of 
inputs between countries are identical. Instead of comparative advantages, international trade 
is driven by product differentiation and increasing returns to scale. Since consumers demand 
alternative product varieties they will be better off with an increased selection of differenti-
ated products according to the theory. The increasing returns to scale will make countries spe-
cialize in a limited range of goods and owing to the international trade market the countries 
will have access to markets abroad as well. This makes it possible to exploit economies of 
scale to a larger degree. The product differentiation will make trade consisting of import of 
                                                 
18
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 111 
19
 Henderson (2008) Electronic source 
20
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 111 
21
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 111 
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product varieties which are not produced domestically and exporting of varieties that are. If 
the Heckscher-Ohlin theory can be considered an inter-industry trade the New Trade Theory 
is more of an intra-industry trade since a two-way trade within the same product category is 
conducted.
22
  
It is understood through the comparative advantage theory that trade should be free and 
is most effective without trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas or other subsidies.
23
  
Trade theory assumes there is a difference between countries, and governments have the 
power to regulate these differences to some extent by taxations on its imported and exported 
goods. These taxations oppose the theory of free trade. The next section will present how a 
tariff works and the EUs relation to tariffs on food.  
Tariffs 
 
Tariffs are defined as a tax levied when goods are imported into a country that will in-
crease the price of the imported goods by a certain amount.  It is the oldest form of a trade 
policy instrument. A tariff gives rise to both costs and benefits for the country imposing the 
tariff and for the different domestic socio-economic groups; costs in higher consumer prices 
which will lead to a decreased demand and loss of consumer surplus and benefits in an in-
creased demand for goods not affected by the tariff which now can be sold at higher prices. 
The government will also benefit from the revenue income from the tariffs. But there is a risk 
that tariffs will lead to an overall efficiency loss since the increased prices will distort the in-
centives of the consumers and producers which in time will lead to a distortion loss of the 
tariff.
24
 
A tariff is an example of political supervision over trade. Figures have been presented 
suggesting that the EU, in comparison to the US and Japan imposes the highest tariff on food 
products of the three. While the efforts for trade liberalization has increased in recent years, 
the EU has taken a rather protectionist stance in its food industry. The same patterns can be 
seen regarding anti-dumping actions; while the OECD countries in total cut the number of 
actions from 536 in 1993 to 314 in 1998 the EU increased its actions from 81 in 1993 to 117 
in 1998 according to OECD statistics. This suggests a relative increase in trade protection 
from the EU.
25
 
As we now have seen different trading partners have different potential to export or im-
port certain goods. The next section will examine how trade theory explains why some states 
gain a larger market share of for example the banana production than others. 
 
Competition & Competiveness 
 
Competiveness can be seen as a concept which covers a lot of different factors and re-
lates to both micro- and macroeconomic issues. The exporter has to have a comparative ad-
vantage which will appear if a country is relatively better at producing a good than another 
country.
26
 
Cost-competiveness is defined as the ability to conquer market shares. This depends to a 
large extent on quantitative factors such as relative wages, relative productivity and the nomi-
nal exchange rate which determines the relative unit cost of production. Other factors that 
                                                 
22
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 112 
23
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 111 
24
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 113 
25
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 115-116 
26
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 135 
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affect the cost-competiveness are the quality and design of the product, company image, mar-
keting and financing as well as the ability to execute export orders.
27
 
The Banana wars are not a unique example of a trade and competition dispute between 
the EU and the US. The mutual application of extraterritorial measures from both sides has 
been the source of many disputes. Both the EU and the US have anti-trust policies (known as 
competition policy within the EU) with extraterritorial application, although it is a relatively 
new policy for the EU. The EU often complained about the US attempting to enforce its anti-
trust laws outside its territory on businesses based inside the EU, but since the EUs Merger 
Regulation from late 1989 was introduced this has changed. The EU has increasingly studied 
and interfered in mergers and acquisitions in other countries, which in return has caused angry 
reactions from the US. In the provisions of the EU competition policy a merger of companies 
requires the approval of the European Commission if a set of conditions are met. But since 
these conditions are not applied to only EU based companies a number of purely American 
mergers have had to be approved by the European Commission. The main objectives behind 
both the EUs competition policy and the US anti-trust legislations are to maintain plurality 
and competition on their respective domestic markets to avoid the building of oligopolies or 
monopolies.
28
 
Factors and theories to what creates trade has been presented, equally important is the 
power politicians have to impact trade since they have a strong and often more short-sighted 
perspective on how trade should be conducted. 
  
 
Political influence on trade 
 
In order to promote its trade a government can for example join a free trade zone, a cus-
toms union, the WTO or sign bilateral agreements with other states. But the will to influence 
trade might not always come from the politicians themselves but rather from private interests. 
The most well-known example in the banana conflict is the influence Chiquita had over the 
American politicians in the beginning of the 1990s. The American businessman Carl Lindner, 
who controlled Chiquita, gave more than $ 500 000 to the Democratic Party in an attempt to 
put the Banana wars on the political agenda.
29
 Consequently; the Republican Senator Bob 
Dole (who had received large donations from Lindner for many years), the then House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich, and members of the Clinton Administration all helped Chiquita to 
open the European markets to its bananas even though relatively few American jobs was at 
stake in this matter.
30
 One could therefore argue that private interests paid politicians to act in 
the banana trade dispute. 
Political influence can also be used to even the score between two large trading partners. 
An example of this is the case between the EU and the US concerning unlawful tax conces-
sions. This was a complaint which has been seen as EUs retaliation for the Banana wars. For 
many years the US gave domestic companies a reduction in US federal income taxes for 
profits derived from exports called Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs). In 1999 the then EU 
Trade Commissioner launched proceedings against these provisions in the World Trade 
Organization. According to the EU, the FSCs provided US companies with illegal tax conces-
sions worth up to $ 4 billion a year which gave them a significant advantage in international 
trade compared to European competitors. Although the FSCs had been sanctioned within the 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1981 the WTO upheld the Commissions 
complaint and authorized the EU to impose countervailing tariffs worth up to $ 4 billion. The 
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30
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EU however has not imposed any tariffs and most likely uses the WTOs decision instead as a 
threat in negotiations with the US to obtain concessions in other areas.
31
 
But sometimes the differences between two trading partners are too vast for a single 
WTO ruling to even the score. The interaction between developing and industrialized gov-
ernments in their trade has raised issues of the possibility of an equal treatment of the two. 
According to Myers one of the most difficult questions triggered by the banana dispute is 
whether anything can be done at international level to mitigate the risk of a “race to the bot-
tom” for producers of a commodity in world surplus in a free market with increasingly fierce 
competition. The WTO insists on absolute parity of treatment between contracting parties in 
the terms of imports and is on the other hand total indifference to the conditions under which 
those imported goods are produced. It is doubtful that the WTO will ever permit differential 
terms of access and the existing non-governmental organizations pressing for provisions of 
this kind will likely prove a long haul.
32
 The GATT has a number of provisions permitting 
preferential treatment of developing countries, but the only relevant special provision in the 
banana dispute to help the ACP countries was a general facility in an article for a waiver from 
specific rules. This waiver could however not be used until the US agreed to support the use 
of it. This is an example of how the dominating trading blocs and especially the US, governs 
international trade agreements. The anti-globalization protests during the 1999 WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle was partly fuelled by the notion that “the few dominant 
powers were using the WTO to penalize the slightest deviation from free-trade rules when it 
suited their interest to do so, regardless of the consequences for small states” according to 
Myers, and many felt WTO procedures appeared to be manipulated against the Caribbean 
states at the behest of the US.
 33
  
In order to protect its domestic market politicians can conduct a protectionist policy by 
restricting and regulating trade with other states through tariffs and quotas. Ricardo’s theory 
of comparative advantages suggests that states gains from a specialization in the production of 
goods where they have their comparative advantage; protectionism therefore holds back our 
development and such markets should be liberated.  
 
Trade liberalization 
 
Trade liberalization is defined as the removal of protectionist measures. Trade liberali-
zation can be either regional or global. The simplest form of regional trade liberalization is to 
establish a free trade area between several countries.
34
 According to economic integration 
theory economic integration has four stages; the set-up of a free trade area, then evolvement 
towards a customs union, the establishment of a common market and the final creation of a 
full economic union.
35
   
The idea behind a free trade area is that a product produced in another country, also part 
of the area, can be cheaper to import rather than producing it domestically if there are no trade 
barriers. This way trade within the area is created. Consequences of a free trade area can in-
clude countries getting specialized in certain products in order to maintain the trade relation 
and other, third countries outside the free trade area losing production to countries where the 
product now is cheaper within the area. Founding a free trade area is usually quite uncontro-
versial in the participating countries since is usually gives economic benefits for its members 
without reducing their political freedom in any substantial way.  
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The second step of a customs union usually follows naturally when a deeper economic 
integration between the participating countries is sought. The main difference between a free 
trade area and a customs union is the common external tariff towards third countries outside 
the customs union, a common external trade policy and an agreement on how the revenues 
from the common external tariff should be divided. Since a customs union requires common 
policies between the members the political integration within the union deepens.  
This makes the third step; the creation of a common markets an easy one to take. The 
participating countries agree to merge their national markets into one, allowing goods, capital, 
services and people to move freely across the territory of the common market. Mutually ac-
cepted rules and regulations have to be established and tariffs, quotas, border and capital con-
trols has to be abolished to achieve a common market.  Third countries outside the common 
market might lose some of their trade as intra-common market deals within the market be-
come easier but the common market should not – at least not theoretically – lead to any higher 
trade barriers for third countries outside the common market.   
If this is the case, the common market has probably taken the fourth step; the economic 
union with common monetary and fiscal policies which are meant to push the internal inte-
gration ahead.
36
  
Trade policy is seen as the area where the EU comes closest to being a federal state and 
it is perceived as successful in creating internal trade liberalization.
37
  
We have now looked at what trade theory suggests triggers trade. Still some EU member 
states has not imported their bananas from effective and competitive banana producers in 
Latin America but rather from small and austere producers in former colonies contradictive to 
for example Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages. The next section will examine the 
EU’s relation to some these states in the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP). 
The EU-ACP relationship 
 
“The Common Market is a European scheme designed to attach African countries to 
European imperialism, to prevent the African countries from pursuing an independent neutral 
policy, to prevent the establishment of mutually beneficial economic ties among these coun-
tries, and to keep the African countries in a position of suppliers or raw materials for imperi-
alist powers.” 
- Joint communiqué by President Nkrumah of Ghana and President Brezhnev of the Soviet Union, 
July 24, 1961 
 
It can be seen as if it was the ACP countries that had most at stake in the Banana wars 
even though the disagreement essentially was between the US and the EU. These developing 
countries, especially in the Caribbean, are all economically vulnerable since their economy 
often rests on one single product – in this case bananas – with small populations, remoteness 
of markets, lack of natural resources and proneness to climate disasters.
38
  
Traditionally the ACP countries, together with the remaining EFTA states, have been at 
the top of the countries closely tied to the EUs external relationships and agreements with the 
most structured relationships, greatest entry to the single market and access to the European 
Development Fund.
39
 
The EU has a history of artificial price-setting. During the 1960s the Union (then the 
EEC) had, through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), fixed prices on for example milk, 
                                                 
36
 Marsh and Mackenstein (2005) p. 30 
37
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 139 
38
 Myers (2004) p. 163 
39
 Marsh and Mackenstein (2005) p. 63 
 15 
 
wine, butter and beef with the aim of becoming self-sufficient, stable the prices for consumers 
and stable the income for those employed in the farming sector. Third countries outside the 
Community were either prevented from accessing the European market altogether or had to 
sell at a price artificially inflated by a levy designed to fall below a reference price.  Farmers 
in member countries were even allowed to sell their products outside the Community while 
receiving subsidies from the CAP effectively keeping the global prices at an artificial low 
since third country farmers could not compete with their prices.
40
 
All ACP member states (except Cuba) has been signatory to cooperation agreements 
with the European community. The next section will further examine first the Lomé Conven-
tions and then the Cotonou Agreement to see what political commitments the EU has and has 
had towards their former colonies.  
 
The Lomé Conventions 
 
“We are dependent on the Third World here and now as well as in the future.  It, in turn, 
depends on us to a considerable degree.  Our interests are linked. We should, therefore, try to 
express this dependence clearly and irrevocably.” 
- Former European Commissioner for Development and French Foreign Minister Claude 
Cheysson on the importance of the Lomé Agreement. 
 
When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 the decolonization process had just started 
and some of the member countries still had colonies and other dependent countries and terri-
tories. The dependencies were, at start, linked to the EEC through special association agree-
ments which combined aid, trade and political cooperation. In article 131 in the EEC Treaty 
the overall aim of the agreement to “promote the economic and social development of the 
countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the 
Community as a whole” was expressed.  However, when the former colonies gained inde-
pendence the special association agreements lost its relevance and was replaced with the arti-
cles 228 and 238 in EECT which dealt with association agreements signed between the 
EC/EU and fully independent and sovereign third countries but the spirit and objectives of the 
original associations with the former colonies were maintained.
41
 The EU has, ever since the 
Treaty of Rome increasingly recognized the need for special, differential treatment of periph-
eral and remote regions of the Community. Article 299 (previously 227) of the Treaty of 
Rome (amended in Amsterdam 1997) states that the Community shall take account of handi-
caps imposed by ”their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, 
economic dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of which severely 
restrain their development”.  The same factors have been arguments to give special treatment 
in international trade for states with the same handicap.  
As a consequence of their new independence the EC set up a convention regarding trade, 
financial and technical assistance between the EC members and the former colonies. The first 
convention, the Yaoundé Convention, was signed in 1963 between six original EEC members 
and seventeen African states, plus Madagascar with a follow up in 1969. As the EC expanded 
the number of former colonies grew, especially when the United Kingdom became an EC 
member in 1973. Two years later, in 1975 the Yaoundé Convention was replaced by the 
Lomé Convention. The Lomé Convention had the same basic target areas of trade, financial 
and technical assistance but concerned an increased number of countries; nine EEC members 
and 46 ACP countries.
42
  The Lomé Convention can be seen as the start of the EECs Develop-
ment Policy. As the members on both sides grew the Lomé Convention has regularly been 
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renewed in Lomé II (1979), Lomé III (1984) and Lomé IV (1989). A few of the arrangements 
in the Lomé Conventions included  free access to the ECs market for 99 % of all ACP pro-
duced products while ACP countries was allowed to impose tariffs on European imports as 
long as they did not discriminate against the ECs in favor of other industrial countries. With 
the respect to the Development Policy there was also a system called STABEX in place to 
ensure stable revenues for the ACP countries for their exports. The system guaranteed the 
ACP countries a minimum income from their most important export goods. If the revenue 
from the exports fell below the average from the previous year the ECs, up to a certain maxi-
mum amount and under certain preconditions, balanced out this loss with a bridging loan or a 
non-refundable grant. The Lomé Conventions did not give the perceived effects, the share of 
ECs trade with ACP countries halved from 7 % in 1975 to between 3 and 4 % in the mid-
1990s. The STABEX system did not have the capacity to bridge the gap between the loss of 
income from exports and the income levels from the previous years and the last Lomé Con-
vention, Lomé IV expired finally in February 2000.
43
 
 
The Cotonou Agreement  
 
When the Lomé Convention had expired it was replaced with a more WTO-oriented 
framework of cooperation between the EU and its former colonies. The Cotonou Agreement 
replaced the non-reciprocal trade preferences, which had existed in the Lomé Convention, 
with economic partnership agreements (EPAs) since they would most likely prove less ad-
vantageous to the ACP countries and instead promoting a sustainable development in these 
countries. The aim of preservation of traditional benefits of each ACP state in the Community 
market in the Lomé Convention was replaced in the Cotonou Agreement with a general com-
mitment in the Community to maintain the viability of the ACP banana industries.
  
The EU persuaded the ACP countries that a new partnership agreement between the two 
was needed. The new agreement emphasized the importance of free trade between the ACP 
countries themselves in a way the Lomé Agreements never did.
 44
 
In two meetings in December 1999 and February 2000 the new agreement was formed 
with its base in five interdependent pillars; the political dimension, the participation pillar, a 
poverty-reduction strategy, a new framework for economic and trade cooperation and a re-
form of financial cooperation. Through WTO compliant transitional agreements the existing 
preferential EU-ACP trade relationship was kept in place during an interim period up to 2008 
when a regional free trade between the ACP countries themselves was expected.
45
 The fourth 
pillar of the Cotonou Agreement; the framework for the economic relationship between the 
EU and the ACP countries overhauled the previous trade relation and was now replaced with 
a more balanced economic integration through WTO-compatible trading arrangements. These 
arrangements was aimed at removing trade barriers between them step by step as well as en-
hancing cooperation in all areas related to trade.
46
 
Just as they do with the ACP countries, the EU shares a common culture and history 
with the US too and the parties have always dependent on each other’s loyalty. As previously 
mentioned, the EU and the US trade relation are very important for their respective econo-
mies. But perhaps the dependency relation has weakened somewhat the last decades, agree-
ments concerning trade between the EU and the US has been presented but rather than an in-
creased cooperation it seems that the competition between them has amplified.  
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The EU-US relationship 
 
Looking at trade statistics there is no doubt that the EU-US trade relationship is “the 
most important bilateral economic relationship for both parties in terms of trade and FDI” 
(Foreign Direct Investment) according to Marsh and Mackenstein. They use figures from 
2002 when the US was the EUs largest trading partner in goods with 18 % of all EU imports 
and 24 % of all EU merchandise exports. The gap to the second largest exporter to the EU; 
China, was immense only accounting for 8, 3 %. The EU in its turn was the US second most 
important export market (exceeded by Canada) with 22 % of the US external merchandise 
trade. But the EU was however the largest merchandise importer to the US with market shares 
of 21 % in 2002.
47
 
Although there have been a lot of obstacles in the US-EU trade relation they are not as 
problematic as the increasing number of cases concerning economic competition which has 
degenerated into trade wars between the two are. Strictly speaking the US is the subject to the 
normal EU external trade regime under the Common Commercial Policy dating back to 1970. 
The bilateral relationship is based on respective unilateral provisions restricted only by the 
agreements entered into under the GATT and the WTO. And even though they are in place to 
prevent trade disputes an increasingly number of cases has occurred, especially following the 
establishment of the WTO.
48
 The main explanation for this is the WTOs appeals mechanism, 
the Dispute Settlement Body. Members of the GATT could not appeal if and when another 
signatory to a given deal failed to its own promises, but the WTO offered a forum which dis-
putes could be debated and judged with the possibility of imposing sanctions in non-compli-
ance cases. Historically the US has been more inclined to appeal in trade disputes (most of 
them concerning the CAP) than the EU, but since the founding of the WTO in 1995 however; 
the EU has gained an increasing confidence to use the WTO against the US as well.
49
 
US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick claimed that it is economic links rather than 
security alliances that have become the “glue” of the post-Cold War EU-US relationship. It is 
a relation that has evolved from post-WW2 with the dominating US and the assisting Europe-
an to one of economic parity after the Cold War, and it is therefore only natural that both 
sides has had to make continual adjustments along the way. The EU is, after the Cold War, no 
longer dependent on the US for its security and with its membership in the WTO; the Union 
now has a quasi-judicial forum through which to seek redress over trade disagreements.
50 
There has been a change in the relation, from trade partners to trade rivals, or as the former 
U.S. Ambassador to the European Union; Rockwell Schnabel described the EU-US economic 
relationship in a speech in 2002 - “a global partnership different from any other in history”.51 
 
The New Transatlantic Marketplace and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
 
There was a transition in the relationship between the US and Europe in the 1980s when 
the US had a growing concern of a relative American economic decline. This gave Europe 
enhanced confidence to act on its own as an assertive international economic actor. The US 
has also criticized the EU for its “continental corporatism” which mainly has to do with the 
European social democratic model for trade compared to the American free market model.
52
  
The Clinton administration promoted US exports to increase and launched several pro-
grams and projects aimed at the European market during the 1990s. The New Transatlantic 
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Agenda for example with its accompanying Joint Action Plan launched in 1995 specified the 
establishment of a “New Transatlantic Marketplace” between the US and the EU. The aim 
was to progressively reduce or eliminate barriers that hinder flows goods, services and capital 
between the two partners. This plan showed an early ambition of creating a common market 
between the US and the EU.
53
 
The development however was slow and three years later, in 1998 the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership was launched to re-ignite the economic relationship between the US 
and the EU and address the continuing barriers to trade and investment that still existed.  The 
Partnership was far more detailed than the New Transatlantic Marketplace had been and with 
provisions on how to proceed and with explicit target dates. The partners stated that ”Our re-
inforced partnership can be instrumental in setting the agenda for a more open and accessible 
world trading system and at the same time can greatly improve the economic relationship 
between the EU and US, reduce frictions between us, and promote prosperity on both sides of 
the Atlantic” through their “determination to maintain open markets, resist protectionism and 
sustain the momentum of liberalization.” Among others, both the US and the EU expressed a 
shared objective of “The full implementation of WTO commitments and respect for dispute 
settlement obligations” in the Transatlantic Economic Partnership.54 
Yet the Transatlantic Economic Partnership has progressed far less quickly than expec-
ted, and the Commission reported in 2002 that a number of impediments still needed to be 
tackled despite the significant cooperative efforts that had been undertaken.
55
 
The Banana wars has been a global disagreement between the EU, the US and banana 
producers in Latin America. The scene for the disagreement has been the World Trade 
Organization. This has been the relevant forum for the trade dispute such as the Banana wars 
and it is expected that rulings by the Organization are to be followed by its members.  
 
The WTO  
 
 “We feel betrayed by the WTO, because we joined the Organisation believing that its 
primary purpose was to bring about improved living standards and equity and fairness in in-
ternational trade… What we find is that the WTO has ended up by being a system in which 
the legitimate interests of small countries will always be sacrificed once they conflict with 
those of the major players”.  
- The then Dominican Prime Minister Edison James in a speech following the results from the 
complaint of 1997. 
 
For the US the trade with Europe has after the Second World War been of great impor-
tance. The economic and political relationship between the two was not just based on the US 
need of allies towards the Soviet bloc during the Cold War but also as a fast growing market 
for American export goods. The US was pushing Europe towards accepting trade liberali-
zations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to further integrate the 
European market in 1947 and a formal economic relationship began with the establishment of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. The trade relation evolved even 
more with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Trade exchanges 
needed thereafter to be conducted in accordance with the rules of a higher authority and any 
trade disagreements had to be submitted to the legally binding judgment of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body.
56
 The impact of the rulings of the WTO is however limited by the 
fundamental right of each state to decide how to implement WTO rulings. The WTO can au-
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thorize a state to impose sanctions but cannot impose a solution or fine itself since this would 
conflict with the principle of sovereign independence of each contracting party.
57
  
Myers view is shared by Jörgensen, Lüthje and Schröder who writes that the WTO still 
has the features of an agreement rather than an organization since it is still governed by con-
sensus politics. In other words, the decision-making in the WTO is based on willingness of 
the participating countries to implement and enforce the WTO decisions.
58
 In the case of the 
EUs influence over global trade liberalization, trade negotiations in the WTO are one of the 
areas where its supranational role is most pronounced. Owing to the fact that the EU member 
states has their own representation in the WTO as well as representation from the EU, a 
united Europe becomes a powerful actor around the negotiation table.
59
 
There is an increased flexibility in WTO’s treatment of small and highly vulnerable 
states as a result of the banana disputes.
 
After influence from WTO members and Doha 
Round trade negotiations the WTO Agricultural Committee stated 2003 in a report that “spe-
cial and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements 
of the negotiations”. However, special dispensations for small vulnerable economies and what 
form these might take is not as agreed upon in the WTO.
 
Suggestions have been made that 
small vulnerable economies for example should be given access of such countries to WTO 
proceedings in which they are third parties in and to provide funding for such states to estab-
lish and maintain mission to the WTO. Other suggestions includes to exempt small vulnerable 
economies from the condition that benefits in regional free trade agreements should be mutual 
and safeguard their existing preferences in moves towards greater liberalization. Such conces-
sions could be helpful for the vulnerable ACP states to move towards regional, or other, 
agreements scheduled under the Cotonou Agreement.
60
  
If trade theory cannot explain EU´s actions in the Banana wars and if the importance of 
the EU’s relation to both the ACP states and the US has been examined it is necessary to see 
what has actually happened in this trade conflict to understand what has induced the EU to 
maintain its banana imports from the ACP states. It is also necessary to examine this in order 
to answer my research questions of how the EU has governed the Banana wars politically and 
if it has been successful in doing so. 
 
The Banana wars - Pre-1993-2000 
 
Since the EU only produces one fifth of its own banana consumption, banana trade with 
the former European colonies in Africa and the Caribbean has been a good way of combining 
a supply to the European market with bananas with supporting the EUs Development Policy 
programs. Although competing Latin American bananas from American owned companies 
was imported too, these were treated much differently than the other bananas. In the comple-
tion of the Single European Market (SEM) in 1993 it was decided that “home produced” 
bananas was supported by way of subsidization and compensation payments if, or when 
banana prices fell below a certain level. And while bananas from the ACP countries was 
guaranteed a tariff-free access to the European Union market for almost all their production, 
bananas from Latin America had more than double the import quota of the ACP bananas as 
well as a tariff on € 100 per tonne (later reduced to € 75 per tonne in 1994).61 The EU allowed 
unrestricted banana imports from its overseas territories and former colonies such as the ACP 
countries and others was tariff-free up to 857 000 tons of bananas. Banana imports from Latin 
America and other “third countries” was assigned a tariff rate quota of 2.2 million tons with 
                                                 
57
 Myers (2004) p. 162 
58
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 114 
59
 Drud Hansen (2001) p. 116 
60
 Myers (2004) p. 163-165 
61
 Marsh and Mackenstein (2005) p. 118 
 20 
 
between 20 and 30 % in-quota tariffs “ad valorem” – a tariff which can vary since it is based 
on the total value of the imported good. Furthermore, the regime imposed an additional 250 % 
“ad valorem tariff” and issued licenses assigned to the quotas among the banana distributors. 
The new SEM regime restricted the access to the European market for banana producing 
countries outside the preferential areas, where bananas from Latin American represented an 
estimated 99.36 % of the non-preferred production.
62
 
Bananas was imported under an assortment of national practices on an individual mem-
ber level before the completion of the SEM; France and the United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal 
and Greece relied on its Overseas Departments or their former colonies while Spain was sup-
plied by its domestic production in the Canary Islands. Germany operated a free trade policy 
while others such as Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands imposed a 
relatively small tariff of 20 %.
63
 
One of the major beneficiaries to the SEM regime was the Caribbean countries. The 
Windward Islands in the eastern Caribbean for example accounted to 3 % of the banana trade 
but supplied the EU with 20 % of the imported bananas. The fear from the ACP countries to 
be driven out of business if the preferences was eliminated was not without root; a metric ton 
of bananas produced in Ecuador cost $ 162 while a metric ton of ACP produced bananas 
could cost up to $ 515. 
The US together with Honduras, Guatemala, Ecuador and Mexico complained about 
certain parts of the SEM regime to the WTO in 1996. The complaining countries said to be 
discriminated unfairly against their interests. The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO ruled 
one year later that the EUs banana import regime did indeed breach the WTOs rules since its 
system of assigning licenses was discriminating growers and marketing companies in the 
challenging countries. The EU presented a revised version of its regime which was estab-
lished on January 1st 1999 were a tariff rate quota of 2 553 million metric ton with an addi-
tional quantity of 850 000 metric ton was assigned to the ACP countries.  However, the new 
regime was also ruled illegal by the WTO since it set aside a quantity of bananas imported 
exclusively from the ACP countries and since the system of assigning licenses still discrimi-
nated.
64 
Even though some of the EU member states like Germany for example wanted to 
reform the EUs banana regime a lot of the European banana producers such as Spain and 
Greece, and the former colonizing members like France and the United Kingdom were not as 
keen. And since the opponents of a substantial change to the EUs banana regime had a major-
ity in the Council the changes that were decided in 1999 was largely cosmetic.
 
 
Subsequently, the US and the co-complaining Latin American countries complained 
once again to the WTO about the EUs banana regime less than a month after the changes had 
been presented. The American Clinton administration imposed punitive sanctions through 
heavy tariffs on fifteen randomly selected European luxury products after the Dispute Settle-
ment Body allowed the US to initiate compensatory retaliation. The tariffs were estimated 
equivalent to an annual cost of € 215.2 million.65    
The EU discussed with the US what would constitute as a banana import regime which 
would comply with WTO rules before presenting a new proposal in October 2000. In the re-
vised proposal three quotas for bananas was suggested – 850 000 tons for the ACP countries, 
2.2 million tons plus an additional 353 000 tons of Latin American bananas. The EU proposed 
an in-quota duty of € 75 per ton on Latin American bananas and a € 300 per ton tariff prefer-
ence on ACP produced bananas. In effect this meant the ACP produced bananas would be 
imported duty free to the EU. The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) claimed 
that a separate quota for ACP bananas guaranteed them to export their entire production while 
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Latin American bananas would continue to be restricted and the US subsequently rejected the 
proposal. The US insisted instead on the allocation of import licenses for bananas which 
would be based on an historical licensing period that would retain or enhance the market 
share for US owned banana producers. Rather than re-entering the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body once more, the US and the EU discussed how to resolve the disagreement over the 
banana trade on their own.  
 
The Banana wars - 2001-2009 
 
“This proves there is no trade issue which lies beyond the reach of WTO members when 
they exhibit good will and a spirit of compromise.” 
- WTO Director General Pascal Lamy commenting the 2009 Geneva deal in a press release 
 
An agreement was met in April 2001 where the EU would establish a tariff-only regime 
for bananas by 2006. The EU agreed to implement an import regime for bananas on the basis 
of historical licensing in 2001 and a quota with tariff preferences would be kept for develop-
ing country exporters of bananas to the EU market. The US agreed to terminate its increased 
duties on luxury goods imported from the EU. Using historical licensing from 1994-1996 as a 
reference period with only a smaller proportion of licenses allocated to newcomers was pri-
mary beneficiary for the US owned banana companies Chiquita and Dole. It was estimated 
that these two companies would share about 44 % of the licenses with two-thirds of the share 
going to Chiquita and the remaining third to Dole.  Their share would be guaranteed until 
2006 when the tariff-only regime would be introduced.
66
 
The EU started a consulting process in 2002 to define the new regime which had been 
agreed in 2001, even though the new policy was not implemented until 2006. The new regime 
allowed all banana producers to compete solely on the basis of tariff differences with no extra 
quotas for Latin American bananas. The regime taxed Latin American bananas € 176 per 
tonne compared to the previous € 75 per tonne with a quota and allowed ACP produced bana-
nas to be duty free up to a quota level of 775 000 ton after which the bananas also would be 
taxed € 176 per tonne.67  
In a press release from the 15th December 2009 the WTO gives a broad description of 
what happened after the 2001 agreement when defining a tariff, a process which Chacón-Cas-
cante and Crespi describes as “diverse and complicated”.68 According to the WTO press re-
lease the EU, under WTO rules had to re-negotiate with all the countries supplying the EU 
with bananas on a non-preferential basis and reach an agreement on the details of the agreed 
tariff-only system. The purpose of the negotiation was to ensure that the EU market share for 
these suppliers was not be less than they had been before. The negotiations were finally over 
in January 2005 and the EU informed the WTO that its new banana tariff would be € 230 per 
tonne. Two months later, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ni-
caragua, Panama, and Venezuela requested a WTO arbitration panel to rule if the proposed 
tariff would maintain existing market access for non-preferential banana producers. The panel 
ruled against the EU’s suggested € 230 per tonne and in September 2005 the EU presented a 
revised tariff of € 187 per tonne. But the non-preferential negotiating partners would not ac-
cept the arbitration panels advised tariff. The EU presented a modified suggestion of a tariff 
of € 187 per tonne on their most favored nation (MFN) and a 775 000 ton tariff quota on 
bananas imported from the ACP countries.  The arbitration panel issued a new report stating 
that the EU’s proposition would not result in in “at least maintaining total market access for 
MFN banana suppliers” and said the EU had failed to rectify the matter. In November 2005 
                                                 
66
 Hanrahan (2001) Electronic source 
67
 Chacón-Casante and Crespi (2006) p. 125 
68
 Chacón-Casante and Crespi (2006) p. 126 
 22 
 
the EU adopted a new tariff of € 176 per tonne for MFN bananas and a zero tariff for ACP 
produced bananas up to 775 000 tons.  Consultations between the EU and the concerned 
banana producing countries followed and in 2007 a panel from the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body ruled that the latest proposal by the EU was in violation with article 1, 2, 3 and 13 of the 
GATT.  During the same year, both Colombia and Panama filed new disputes against the EU. 
The EU spent most of the first half of 2008 engaged in discussions with the Latin American 
banana producers in order to conclude a comprehensive agreement to set the new EU bound 
tariff duty. The EU also reported regularly to the Dispute Settlement Body about its progress 
in settling its six disputes and two arbitrations processes in the WTO. The WTO held several 
meetings between Colombia and the EU and Panama and the EU as well as with interested 
WTO members and ACP banana producers. In July 2008 a number of Ministers attended a 
meeting of the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) in Geneva to partake in the Doha Round 
negotiations to reach an agreement on the targets in agriculture and industrial products. A full 
solution of the banana issue was part of these larger Doha Round negotiations but the TNC 
was not capable to reach an agreement on the Doha Round targets or the banana issue. How-
ever, all parties agreed to continue the discussions to find a solution and on the 15
th
 December 
2009 they finally did agree to the “Geneva deal”. 
The deal was that the EU would lower its tariffs on bananas in stages from 2009 up to 
2017, from € 148 per metric tonne to € 114 and it was agreed that the EU would maintain a 
most favored nation (MFN) tariff-only regime for its importation of bananas.
69
 In other 
words, ACP produced bananas would still be imported duty free to the EU market. To further 
help the ACP countries adjust to the gradually harder competition from Latin America the EU 
agreed to support these countries with up to € 200 million from its budget. 
The European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso was quoted in New York 
Times calling the agreement “a compromise that works for all sides.” A solution to the dis-
pute was in the EUs interest as well since the banana dispute had undermined the EUs ability 
to take other trade associates to task for breach of WTO rules. The ruling opens for Latin 
American banana producers to increase their export to the EU and Professor Giovanni Anania 
of the University of Calabria in Italy projected in a report that European imports of bananas 
would increase with 6 % after the tariff cuts.
70
 
In the beginning of February 2011 the Geneva deal was finally past in the European 
Parliament (501 votes for and 114 votes against). The European United Left–Nordic Green 
Left and the Greens–European Free Alliance voted against the deal in the International Trade 
Committee since they believed the deal would endanger the basic rights of small producers by 
strengthening the monopoly-liked position of the large US owned companies in control of the 
banana market in the Latin American countries.
71
 
 
Discussion 
 
In my method section my ambition was to set up a qualitative expectation of why the ex-
amined research problem occurred. We have seen that neoliberal trade theory suggest trade to 
be free and without any tariffs or quotas in order to be most effective. In other words; the 
banana trade between the EU and its former colonies in the ACP countries cannot be explain-
ed by trade theory. I have tried to answer what can by adding relevant chapters and 
“grounded” my theoretical knowledge. I will now continue with a discussion including both 
my research questions and how I interpret the contents in the preceding chapters. 
Previously I have described my definition of politically as EU’s external trade actions in 
relations to other trade partners such as the ACP countries, the US/Latin American countries 
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and within the World Trade Organization. With “the EU” I refer to decisions and actions in 
this conflict by the European Parliament.  
The answer to how the EU has governed the Banana wars politically can only be seen as 
a result of the European colonial heritage. The rational way to look at the banana disagree-
ment from a trade theory perspective suggests that it cannot be anything but political values 
behind this quarrel. Seen from Ricardo’s perspective the US, thanks to its Latin American 
banana production, has the comparative advantage compared to the ACP countries. Spinning 
on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory the pressure on the ACP banana producers will get even 
stronger as the comparative advantages between the Latin American producers and the Euro-
pean market will be even clearer as trade barriers gradually disappear with the agreement. The 
New Trade Theory demands the ACP countries to be on an equal level with the EU to achieve 
an intra-industry trade relation – something that neither the size of population, economy or 
climate permits. 
Could the actions in the dispute by the EU be explained by a loyalty on a state-level to-
wards their old colonies? One way of examining this is to compare the former colonizers 
trade export to the former colony with a similar European states export to the same former 
colony. By using statistics from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database a 
clear pattern is revealed; the former colonizers export is far greater than the similar “neutral” 
state’s export. France had for example a total export to Cameroon worth $ 790 723 487 in 
2010 while the United Kingdom’s export to Cameroon was only worth $ 62 567 721. The 
United Kingdom on the other hand had an export to the Windward Island of Saint Lucia 
worth $ 23 455 484 in 2010 while Germany´s export was valued $ 3 519 244. Spain´s export 
to its former colony of the Dominican Republic was $ 348 592 373 in 2010 compared to 
France export of $ 107 829 063 the same year.
72
 It is clear that a relationship between the 
former colonizer and colony still exists, the reason might be explained by a shared political 
and cultural background and a shared history but it is not likely to be explained by gains fol-
lowing strict trade theory.  
 In their book “The Geography of World trade” (Världshandelns geografi 1983) Alvstam 
and Lundin writes that the trade relation between Europe and its colonies was not equal or in 
both parties interest but rather a way for Europe to acquire raw materials at a low-cost. Ac-
cording to Alvstam and Lundin there was never a question of any real trade relation between 
the two sides taking place, European colonialists exploited their colonies to drain as much 
resources as possible from them.
73
 They draw on the same idea as Martin´s theory of “Eurafri-
ca” where Europe and Africa complement each other; Europe requires Africa´s raw materials 
and markets while Africa needs the capital, technology and know-how from Europe. The ex-
planation to this is, according to Martin´s theory, found in the colonial days of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries when the ruling classes of Europe (politicians, military, 
merchants, missionaries) justified their political domination, economic exploitation and cul-
tural subjugation of Africa. One of the most serious and far-reaching consequences for Africa 
is according to Martin the complete dependency of the European market.
74
  
Martin sees the practice of neo-colonialism taking place (in his definition “the survival 
of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging 
countries which become the victims of and indirect and subtle form of domination by politi-
cal, economic, social, military or technical means”) in the relationship between Europe and 
Africa. One of the main consequences of this has been the continued economic domination of 
the newly independent nations from their former colonizers side.
 
Martin refers to Nkrumah, 
the first President of a Ghana, and his definition in his text “Neo-colonialism: the last stage of 
imperialism” (1965) of the essence of neo-colonialism as being a state theoretically independ-
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ent and which has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty but with its economic 
system and thus its political policy directed from the outside.
75
  
The one-way trade Alvstam and Lundin write about has led to the former colonies – of-
ten developing countries – being specialized on exporting one single or very few produce or 
product. This makes the developing countries more vulnerable and dependent on their export 
to the often uncertain world market than most industrialized countries is. While it is rare for 
an industrialized country to have more than 20 % of their total export from their most impor-
tant goods the developing, former colonies can receive well over 90 % of their export income 
from one single product. This makes them especially vulnerable to price and volume fluctua-
tions according to Alvstam and Lundin.
76 
The relation between the former colonizers – the EU 
– and its former colonies –the ACP countries – cannot be said to be a traditional trade relation 
that can be terminated without any severe consequences for the parties involved. When ap-
plying Ricardo’s and Heckscher-Ohlin’s trade theories the ACP countries can be said to have 
a comparative advantage producing bananas compared to EU states. However the Latin 
American banana producers have an even greater advantage (made clear by their lower pro-
duction cost), especially when the unfair trade conditions disappear in the implementation of 
the Geneva deal. This is why the tariffs and customs on bananas from the EU were needed in 
the first place – to keep the relative comparative advantage between the ACP and the EU on 
bananas intact.  
To continue the trade relation between the colonizers and its former colonies the EU has 
sought to create trade agreements between them, first with the Yaoundé Convention, followed 
by the Lomé Agreements and later the Cotonou Agreement. The trade agreements may seem 
to be purely economic at a first glance but actually there are a lot of politics in them as well. 
Hurt writes that the ACP countries strongly refuted to see the Lomé Agreements as anything 
but economic agreements and it was not until the signing of the Lomé III that politics came 
into the picture. Politics was further emphasized in the Cotonou Agreement with focus on 
political dialogue and aid. Hurt argues that in fact the EU-ACP relation has always been po-
litical and not economic and that claiming anything else only shows the false neo-liberal idea 
the EU has had of itself.
 77
  Martin compares the first Lomé Agreement with neo-colonialism 
and sees the new division of labour where the Third World specialize in production and ex-
portation of raw materials and agricultural products while industrialized countries reserve for 
themselves the most capital-intensive, technologically-advanced types of production. This is, 
according to Martin, evidence for a continued unequal exchange between the EU and the ACP 
countries. Martin claims that the first Lomé Agreement was nothing but a neo-colonial pact 
which linked Europe and Africa to a contractual relationship of little value to the latter, but of 
great benefit to the former.
78
 And by the looks of it, little has changed with the Cotonou 
Agreement; a coalition of 22 NGOs called “Eurostep” aimed at “ensuring that the policies and 
practices of the European Union and national European governments promote people centered 
sustainable development in all parts of the World” published a critical report in May 2000 
about the agreement.  The ACP-EU relation is still a very unequal one according to Euro-
step’s report, if for example anything in the agreement is breached by an ACP country the EU 
can suspend funding with consultations taking place between a single ACP State on one side 
and all EU member states on the other. Eurostep also acknowledges that even though the 
Cotonou Agreement addresses a wider range of issues outside traditional development co-
operation, it has failed to provide the institutional mechanisms to do so and although poverty 
eradication plays a central role in ACP-EU relations the Agreement fails to safeguard this.
79
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Marsh and Mackenstein see the Cotonou Agreement as a demonstration of EUs commitment 
to spread free trade, not just between itself and its partners but also among its partners, al-
though the Unions own discriminatory structures of for example the CAP still exists.
80
 The 
EU-ACP relation will continue to be important but with a third actor involved; the WTO. 
Marsh and Mackenstein acknowledges that even though a new and higher authority has been 
created through the WTO the EU-ACP relationship will still probably encounter major diffi-
culties along the way.
81
 To use the WTO as the major justification in the Cotonou Agreement 
and towards the ACP as a whole has been a strategy from the EU’s side to externalize respon-
sibility for its own policy according to Hurt. The EU portrays WTO rules as fixed and immu-
table and not as politically constructed as they in fact are.
82
  
It can be safe to conclude at this stage that the EU´s action in the Banana wars was a re-
sult of the interdependency relation between the EU and the ACP countries rather than any 
economic trade advantages. So what should the ACP countries do to become less dependent 
on the EU? Martin suggests that the Third World countries should develop preferential eco-
nomic links with other developing countries in the pursuit of economic independence.
83
 
Alvstam and Lundin agrees with Martin and writes that an unequal trade relation between 
industrialized and developing countries can benefit the developing countries in a short per-
spective since they gain access to goods they do not produce themselves, however in a longer 
perspective it also enhances their dependence on a continued imbalanced trade with industri-
alized countries. This can be countervailed by the Import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
policy aimed at reducing states foreign dependency through a local production of industrial-
ized products.
84
 According to Alvstam and Lundin the developing countries would become 
more self-reliance if their trade with industrialized countries was replaced with trading with 
other developing countries.
85
 That might be difficult since these countries does not have a 
history of trading with each other; Galtung writes that one of the main rules of neo-colonial-
ism is making sure that the countries being dominated does not have much direct, horizontal 
contact with each other, particularly when it comes to trade. This pattern can be seen in both 
the US and the European background of colonization where trade between the colonizing 
state and its colony is dependent of each other and trade seems very vertical. Galtung writes 
that international contacts in neo-colonialism should not be with the periphery countries but 
rather just vertical towards the center.
86
 This rule has no doubt rooted the EU-ACP 
interdependence relation even deeper.  
Martin looks closer at the neo-classical theories of comparative advantages and the in-
terdependence relation between the EU and the ACP countries where countries that remain 
strictly specialized in a specific type of production must necessarily import goods which are 
not made locally. This perpetuates the old neo-colonial relationship between them and main-
tains the ACP countries dependence of the EU according to Martin.
87
 Väyrynen agrees with 
this view and regards the concept of interdependence as nothing but an ideological weapon 
which strives to consolidate capitalist countries against the Third World and for coercing 
them to compromise with imperialism by appealing to the “common destiny” of the upper 
classes of the Third World and the leading capitalist countries.
88
 There is however a discrep-
ancy between EU’s presents view and how the European colonizers viewed this issue since 
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both Martin’s and Väyrenen’s texts was written over 30 years ago when the EU consisted 
mainly of former colonizers.  
So do the banana producers in the ACP countries have a future? On paper the EU has 
committed itself to ensure a continued viability of the ACP banana industry in the Cotonou 
Agreement. If the tariff quota system should be replaced by a single tariff, it would have to be 
fixed at a high enough level to allow the ACP counties to maintain their market share accor-
ding to Myers. Just as Guyomard et al, Myers sees a differentiation between the ACP coun-
tries as necessary and that the EU only can live up to its commitments towards these countries 
by accepting the need of some form of direct aid to the most vulnerable banana growers in the 
Caribbean. According to Guyomard et al one major problem for the ACP countries is that 
they are seen as one, joined group when they really are very different from each other. The 
nature and geography in the Caribbean countries are very different from the West African 
countries which make it easier to produce bananas in Cameroon and Ivory Coast than in the 
Windward Islands for example. Even if the trade agreements would benefit the ACP countries 
there is a sort of “cannibalism” within the ACP group where the West African countries 
would be able to have a larger production and lower prices than the Caribbean countries.
89
  
Hurt writes that when drafting the Cotonou Agreement the European Commission suggested 
splitting the ACP countries into six different regions; West Africa, Central Africa, East Afri-
ca, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and the Pacific Region. The idea was to ease the internal competition between 
the APC countries but the proposal was not accepted.
90
  
Guyomard et al suggests that the EU has to consider each ACP country on an individual 
level and not as a single group and that a gradual reform process to differentiate the countries 
should be realized.  They also suggest a take on the New Trade Theory where the EU could 
assist the ACP countries in quality improvement and product differentiation such as organic 
and/or fair trade bananas as well as income support, aids to increased competiveness, diversi-
fication and restructuring.
91
 There is also the suggestion by Myers to help the ACP countries 
reach greater liberalization by exempting small vulnerable economies from the condition that 
benefits in regional free trade agreements should be mutual and safeguard their existing prefe-
rences.
92
 In the end, the survival of a Caribbean banana production depend on “whether the 
market can be induced to accept that price should not always be the sole or overriding crite-
rion for purchase” Myers write.93 
With a growing number of countries from the Eastern bloc joining the European Union 
Myers sees a very different future EU-ACP relation. The new member states have no histori-
cal ties with the Caribbean or with the ACP countries in general, and they prioritize low im-
port prices of foodstuff that they do not produce themselves.
94
  
Chacón-Cascante and Crespi refers to different authors who has tried to calculate a tariff 
level that is equivalent to the tariff-quota system that had been used before the agreement in 
2001. The WTO enforced the EU to set its new tariff at a level that would allow full market 
access for other markets according to Chacón-Cascante and Crespi. The calculations by the 
different authors varies a lot in models and parameters  but all the presented calculations 
points to the same result; it is impossible to maintain the old market structure with ACP pro-
duced bananas as a relevant competitor by using just a tariff restriction as decided in the 
agreement. In a calculation by Guyomard and Le Mouël (referenced in Chacón-Cascante and 
Crespi 2006, p. 125) a tariff of about € 182 per tonne was estimated to maintain the old mar-
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ket structure, compared to the agreed € 176 per ton, and that would only maintain the market 
shares for the first year – 2006. If the ACP countries were to uphold their 2005 market share 
for the subsequent years the import tax must increase further according to Guyomard and Le 
Mouël.  A study by Arias et al (referenced in Chacón-Cascante and Crespi 2006, p. 125) in 
2006 tested different market scenarios and how it would affect the corresponding tariff and 
concluded that the EU had to introduce a number of policy instruments if it was to achieve all 
policy objectives agreed. The 2001 agreement of a single tariff level would not allow the ACP 
countries the same market share as they have had.  Arce et al (referenced in Chacón-Cascante 
and Crespi 2006, p. 126) tried to define the minimum tariff level to maintain the same market 
structure as during the tariff-quota system. Their estimation was that the EU would have to 
impose tariff levels of € 259.8 per tonne for maintaining the 2004 market structure. The Latin 
American countries had initially requested a tariff level of € 75.95 In other words; the future 
for the banana production in ACP countries looks gloomy.  
My definition of “successful” for the purpose of this thesis and its research question is 
“has the European Union been able to uphold its trade with its former colonies”. My view of 
EU’s successfulness must be divided into the past, present and the future. Since the EU during 
the latest decade has evolved significant to include young states with no colonization heritage 
or history the previously prioritized issue of supporting the ACP countries relations with the 
EU has been downgraded on its agenda.  
If the necessary conversions in their economies are executed the ACP are one of the 
main beneficiaries in the short perspective since they will have an assured market for their 
bananas up to 2017 and will still be imported duty free. As Chacón-Casante and Crespi has 
shown the final tariff of € 114 per metric tonne will not be enough for the ACP banana pro-
ducers to compete with the Latin American producers in a longer perspective but it still gives 
the ACP countries time to diversify away from the high-cost banana production and establish 
a new industry. The € 200 million they will receive from the EU budget will probably assist 
them in this process.
96
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to see if it is possible to govern trade markets politically 
and on what grounds the EU has based its behavior in the longest running trade dispute so far. 
By using various sources my goal was to see what, if not trade theory, could explain the EU’s 
actions in the Banana wars. The thesis summarize the main events of the conflict, explains 
how trade should be conducted in theory and tries to clarify the miscellaneous and complex 
tariff and quota regimes for banana imports that have existed in the last decade and how they 
came about. I will now answer my two research questions and see what conclusion may be 
drawn. 
 
How has the Banana wars been governed by the EU politically? 
 
According to my research the present trade agreements in place between the founding 
nations of EU and some of its former colonies – the Cotonou Agreement, undoubtedly have 
been made with the old colonial structures still intact. This is for example clearly visible in 
the export statistics in Appendix 1. This loyalty has affected EU policies concerning the 
banana trade and has probably been the main reason for the disagreement commonly known 
as the Banana wars.  
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The theories discussed in this thesis concerning trade make the assumption that free 
trade is the only and most effective way to nurture growth and wealth. Free trade is per defi-
nition the most efficient way of conducting business. My empirical findings and my analysis 
however shows that other more political factors should be addressed as well as the old neo-
colonial structures which still influences how governments and institutions set up trade 
agreements. We then move from answering how the Banana wars have been governed by the 
EU politically to instead address political influence in bilateral trade agreements. I have in 
here identified a clear difference in how US based trade and EU based trade are conducted 
and governed. Where the US follows neoliberal trade theory, EU trade has more of political 
influence.  
The importance of old colonial structures gradually declines in the EU because of the 
intake of new members of the Union. This leads to a decreased interest in supporting old col-
onies of the founding nations of the EU and effectively cut the ties between the EU and the 
ACP countries when the Geneva deal was signed. The US history however shows a close co-
operation between corporations and the government. Where European economy through its 
trade policies is influenced by its politics through its colonial heritage, the US politics through 
trade policy is influenced by their economy i.e. their major corporations. It seems as the real 
colonialism today can be found in the US in its reluctance to give anyone else but themselves 
a chance to produce bananas in Latin America. 
Looking at the responsibility taken by the EU for its former colonies a political change is 
visible. From the special treatment in international trade based on article 299 in the Treaty of 
Rome and in the Lomé Convention to a much less visible responsibility in the Cotonou 
Agreement with a more general commitment to maintain the viability of the ACP countries 
and an increased emphasis on the World Trade Organizations role instead. 
Since the Geneva deal makes the future for ACP banana producers uncertain the future 
for the Latin-American banana producers has not changed compared to before. The Geneva 
deal together with the gradual improvements in the ACP/EU agreements starting with the 
Lomé agreements and ending with the Cotonou agreement which the EU refers to as its com-
mitment to spread free trade marks this change while the relation between the American com-
panies and their Latin American counterparty remains in a status quo. In the long run the ACP 
countries are given the incitements to diversify their production and reduce their dependence 
of one single export market and commodity. In the short run however the Geneva deal chal-
lenges their ability to compete with the Latin American banana producers who most likely 
will benefit from increased shares on the European banana market. 
 
Has the EU been successful in governing the Banana wars? 
 
As I previously stated in my definition of the successfulness of EU’s ability to upheld 
trade with its former colonies, the question needs to be viewed in the historical as well as fu-
ture context. Since the EU during the last decade has grown significant the present Union 
does not prioritize the upholding of the neo-colonial structures of some of the founding EU 
members. As I previously have shown in Appendix 1 the old colonial powers still have rela-
tive large portion of their trade with its former colonies and they are therefore likely to sup-
port continued ACP banana trade. However since the EU agreed on the Geneva deal this indi-
cates a paradigm shift in the focus of EU governing where the issue seems to be less impor-
tant. Taking into consideration that the trade between EU and its founding nations and ACP 
countries for centuries has been going on at prices above market terms one has to agree that 
the EU, and the former colonizing countries before that, has been successful in upholding the 
trade. It is my beliefs however that in the short term due to the Geneva deal and the new blend 
of members in the Union this will effectively normalize the price of bananas in the EU to be 
more at market-terms. In the long term the Geneva deal could lead to higher prices of bana-
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nas. The aim of the agreed deal is that the greater competition from Latin American banana 
producers in the EU market will lead to cheaper bananas for the European consumers. But in 
the longer perspective it is more likely that the ACP countries will see both their market share 
and incomes decline as the EU market will be dominated by a few large US owned banana 
producers. The Latin American producers have the financial muscles to dump banana prices 
to bust their competitors, just as they did when they established themselves on the German 
market.  Fewer competitors usually lead to higher prices.
97
 My conclusion is that the EU has 
been successful in upholding the trade with its former colonies for such a long time, the prices 
of bananas for the consumers should in the short term go down however the future is more 
uncertain. The Geneva deal rulings will according to studies made by Chacón-Casante and 
Crespi make it impossible for ACP produced bananas to compete with Latin American pro-
duced bananas, this has to be viewed as a failure in the EU’s ability to govern the future 
banana import for the European market, thus not successful. On the other hand, looking at the 
Cotonou agreement the EU seem to be less interested in governing this issue at the moment 
and the colonial heritage will probably receive even less attention in the future EU with states 
from the former Eastern bloc joining.   
The EU’s relation to the ACP countries shows the tangible relation trade creates. It is 
equally evident in the trade relation between the EU and the US. Much of the EU’s stamina in 
this trade conflict has come after a change in the relationship between Europe and the US 
during the last decades. When the Cold War ended Europe became less dependent of the US 
for its security and with the creation of the WTO, a perfect forum to test the limits of global 
trade was formed. Although still an important trade partner, the US has to find itself less im-
portant now than it once was for the EU and the EU has to accept the reverse too. 
I concur with Guyomard et al suggestion that the forthcoming banana production in the 
ACP countries should depend on a variation on the New Trade Theory; the consumers de-
mand for alternative products. If these bananas had better taste, was of better quality or had 
other apparent merits there could still exist a demand for ACP bananas on the European mar-
ket. However, it would have to be an inter-industry trade relationship. But I doubt that there is 
a real possibility for this, although the climate might be right in the ACP countries for pro-
ducing bananas the Latin American producers has vast advantages regarding the size of labour 
force and croplands which enables them to always be cheaper than the ACP producers as 
neoliberal trade theories suggests. If the ACP producers find a product differentiation within 
the banana production, Latin American producers would probably soon offer a similar pro-
duct at a lower price. 
 
My contribution and suggested topics for future research 
 
A master thesis should not just describe a process or a phenomenon; I am also expected 
to contribute to the research with my own material. Since this is a relatively explored subject, 
my contribution is to share my view of the solution presented and made visible by the Geneva 
deal. The EU agreed last year to allow the American owned banana produces a higher access 
to the European market in steps until 2017; this is what I refer to as the Geneva deal. My con-
tribution has been to predict the future consequences of this and whether the Banana wars 
now has ended or not. My contribution has also been to add the relevant pieces of the puzzle 
together to show that it has been something other than economic motives in this conflict 
namely also to show that politics seems to have played a larger part in the outcome of the 
Banana disagreement than what first seems to be the case.  
The WTO rulings have placed the economies in the small and vulnerable economies of 
the ACP countries under threat. Since they are highly dependent on just one product, bananas, 
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some other form of employment and earnings must be found. A build-up of an alternative 
industry requires a degree of protection for these sensitive economies and it is important that 
the WTO recognize this and enable these countries to maintain subsidies to offset their cost 
disadvantages. It seems as the US controlled, Latin American banana producers in the end has 
the most to gain from the Geneva deal and that the EU has only protracted the inevitable dé-
nouement. The banana trade between the EU and the ACP countries was founded on the 
wrong reasons and should have been terminated several years ago. As a consequence of the 
dispute the EU has had sanctions imposed for its non-compliance on a selection of goods ex-
ported to the US. The WTO imposed penalties on businesses which was totally unrelated to 
the banana issue. The WTO also authorized Ecuador to impose sanctions on EU goods but 
Ecuador did not exercise it since the sanctions would only damage its own economy. In the 
future it would perhaps be more rational to penalize industries active in the same sector as the 
product of controversy or as Myers suggests, that compensation should take the form of ob-
ligatory liberalization by the offending state instead of additional trade restrictions by the 
winning side.
 98
 This would be more consistent with the WTO objective to foster and liberal-
ize trade. This goal contradicts the real outcome of the Geneva deal where the US controlled 
trade seems to be the real beneficiary. My suggestion for a future research study is whether 
the current sanctions used by WTO can be more precise and narrowly applied to better solve 
the complex issues and to be more in line with WTO’s objectives. 
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Appendix 1 
Value of export 2010 (Former colonizer in bold) 
Country statistics from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(comtrade.un.org/db/) 
 
West Africa: 
Year Exporting state Importing state Value 
2010 France  Cameroon  $790,723,487  
2010 Germany  Cameroon  $167,759,029  
2010 United Kingdom  Cameroon  $62,567,721  
 
   2010 France  Senegal  $946,924,912  
2010 Germany  Senegal  $96,410,859  
2010 United Kingdom  Senegal  $787,150,696  
 
   2010 France  Côte d'Ivoire  $1,082,757,771  
2010 Germany  Côte d'Ivoire  $151,958,206  
2010 United Kingdom  Côte d'Ivoire  $81,521,194  
 
The Caribbean: 
 
Year 
Exporting state Importing state Value 
2010 United Kingdom  Jamaica  $105,770,512  
2010 France  Jamaica  $22,722,762  
2010 Germany  Jamaica  $33,685,898  
 
   
2010 Spain  Dominican Rep.  $348,592,373  
2010 Germany  Dominican Rep.  $201,381,326  
2010 United Kingdom  Dominican Rep.  $167,713,988  
2010 France  Dominican Rep.  $107,829,063  
 
   
2010 United Kingdom  Dominica  $8,951,155  
2010 Germany  Dominica  $1,128,914  
2010 France  Dominica  $2,317,080  
 
   
2010 United Kingdom  Saint Lucia  $23,455,484  
2010 Germany  Saint Lucia  $3,519,244  
2010 France  Saint Lucia  $8,066,037  
 
   
2010 United Kingdom  Grenada  $8,674,888  
2010 Germany  Grenada  $1,926,574  
2010 France  Grenada  $2,277,313  
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Appendix 2 
 
List of ACP Countries 
 
Angola   
Antigua and Barbuda   
Belize  
Cape Verde  
Comoros   
Bahamas  
Barbados  
Benin  
Botswana   
Burkina Faso   
Burundi  
Cameroon  
Central African Republic   
Chad  
Congo (Brazzaville) 
Congo (Kinshasa)  
Cook Islands  
Cote d'Ivoire   
Cuba   
Djibouti  
Dominica   
Dominican Republic  
Eritrea  
Ethiopia  
Fiji  
Gabon  
 
Gambia  
Ghana  
Grenada  
Republic of Guinea  
Guinea-Bissau  
Equatorial Guinea  
Guyana  
Haiti   
Jamaica  
Kenya  
Kiribati  
Lesotho  
Liberia  
Madagascar  
Malawi  
Mali  
Marshall Islands  
Mauritania  
Mauritius   
Micronesia  
Mozambique   
Namibia  
Nauru  
Niger  
Nigeria  
Niue  
Palau   
 
Papua New Guinea  
Rwanda  
St. Kitts and Nevis   
St. Lucia   
St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines  
Solomon Islands   
Samoa   
Sao Tome and Principe   
Senegal  
Seychelles   
Sierra Leone  
Somalia  
South Africa   
Sudan  
Suriname   
Swaziland  
Tanzania   
Timor-Leste   
Togo  
Tonga   
Trinidad and Tobago  
Tuvalu  
Uganda  
Vanuatu  
Zambia   
Zimbabwe 
 
 
Source: www.acp.int/node/7  
Retrieved: 2012-05-15  
